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Visual saliency influences ethical blind spots and (dis)honesty
Andrea Pittarello1,2 & Marcella Frătescu2 & Sebastiaan Mathôt2
# The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
Recent work suggests that dishonesty results from ethical blind spots: people’s lack of attention to ethical information. In two
experiments (one pre-registered) we used eye tracking to investigate when ethical blind spots emerge, and whether they can be
reduced through a simple, non-invasive intervention. Participants reported a Target Digit indicated by a jittery cue that was
slightly biased in the direction of another digit (the Second-Cued Digit), which could be either higher or lower than the Target
Digit. Participants were paid more for reporting higher digits, and were not penalized for making mistakes, thus providing an
incentive to cheat. Results showed that participants frequently made self-serving (and rarely self-hurting) mistakes by reporting
the Second-CuedDigit when it wasmore valuable than the target. Importantly, they rapidly gazed at the digit that theywould later
report, regardless of whether this report was correct or a self-serving mistake. Finally, we were able to reduce or increase the
number of self-serving mistakes by respectively increasing or reducing the visual saliency of the Target Digit. We suggest that
increasing the visual saliency of morally desirable options is a promising cost-effective tool to curb dishonesty.
Keywords Morality . Attention . Eyemovements . Blind spots . Pre-registration
Introduction
Although people think of themselves as honest –more honest
than others even (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011) –most peo-
ple occasionally cheat. According to self-concept mainte-
nance theory (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008), when people
are faced with a choice between honesty and dishonesty, they
cheat to the extent to which they can justify their misbehavior
(Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011). According to
bounded ethicality theory (Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji,
2005), dishonesty results from “ethical blind spots.”
FollowingBazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011), we define ethical
blind spots as situations in which people pay little (or no)
attention to ethical considerations when doing so is against
their self-interest (for a similar definition, see Bazerman,
2014; Pittarello, Leib, Gordon-Hecker, & Shalvi, 2015). For
instance, imagine a CEO conflicted between recalling a
malfunctioning product that can hurt people (and thus losing
money) or ignoring this issue and leaving the product on the
market (and thus earning money). In this situation, the finan-
cial incentive to keep the product on the market can avoid the
CEO from paying attention to the ethical issue, in turn increas-
ing dishonesty. At times, blind spots are unintentional (e.g.,
when people are unaware of a conflict of interest), while at
other times they represent an intentional justification strategy,
such as when people avoid attending to information that will
prevent them from obtaining undeserved gains (see Jacobsen,
Fosgaard, & Pascual-Ezama, 2018; Pittarello, Motro,
Rubaltelli, & Pluchino, 2016).
Recent work has used eye tracking to show that blind spots
emerge more often in tempting and ambiguous situations,
where ambiguity serves as a justification to do wrong; this is
in line with the notion of self-concept maintenance (i.e., it
allows people to maintain a positive self-image) as well as
bounded ethicality. For instance, Pittarello et al. (2015) asked
participants to report the outcome of a die roll (one of six dice)
appearing closest to a fixation cross to determine their pay,
with higher rolls corresponding to higher payoffs. Ambiguity
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was manipulated by displaying the fixation cross on the mid-
point of either the right or left side of the die. At times, the die
second closest to the fixation cross was higher (and thus more
profitable) than the target die. In these ambiguous settings,
participants exhibited blind spots: They looked more at the
higher die, even if it was not the target.
Our research question is to understand when, during the
decision process, blind spots arise. We hypothesize that
they occur rapidly, and base our prediction on research
on behavioral ethics that employs a dual-process perspec-
tive (Evans, 2008; Haidt, 2007; Kahneman, 2011; Strack &
Deutsch, 2004); according to research, in tempting situa-
tions, people’s first reaction is to serve their self-interest.
As a case in point, Shalvi et al. (2012, 2013) found that
people cheated more under time pressure than when given
ample time. Similarly, Mead et al. (2009) and Gino et al.
(2011) found that people cheat more when they lack self-
control and when their cognitive capacities are reduced.
Finally, work on neuroscience showed that areas of the
brains associated with self-control are activated when peo-
ple avoid lying (Greene & Paxton, 2009). To sum, this
work shows that in tempting situations, people’s initial
motivation is to lie.
While motivation affects cheating, in tempting situations it
also makes people perceive and process information in a self-
serving way (Balcetis & Dunning, 2006). This suggests that
when cheating pays off and justifications are available, people
should quickly gaze at tempting (yet dishonest) information
that would allow them to earn undeservedmoney while in turn
paying little attention to honest (but less profitable informa-
tion). Thus, we predict that when facing the opportunity to
cheat, blind spots manifest quickly during the decision
process.
Eye tracking is a powerful tool to detect when ethical blind
spots arise, because fast eye movements are largely beyond
voluntary control, and reflect involuntary processes such as
previous rewards (we tend to first look at things that were
previously rewarded, regardless of whether they will be
rewarded again) and visual saliency (we tend to first look at
things that have sharp edges, high luminance contrast, etc.)
(Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012; Theeuwes, Kramer,
Hahn, & Irwin, 1998).
Hochman and colleagues (2016) tested whether people
immediately look at profitable, yet “dishonest,” options by
asking participants to report whether there were more dots
on either the left or right side of a square. In the experi-
mental trials, participants received more money if they re-
ported one side of the square (e.g., always the left side)
irrespective of the accuracy of the response. This provided
them with an opportunity to cheat. By tracking eye move-
ments, the authors found that when participants cheated,
they tended to look immediately at the highly rewarded
half, rather than the half that actually contained more dots.
This finding is important and provides initial support for
the rapid emergence of blind spots. However, in this ex-
periment, the rewarded side was kept constant throughout
blocks of many trials; therefore, the results cannot tell us
whether the eye movements toward the highly rewarded
side indeed reflected a fast tendency to cheat, or rather a
strategy that built up over time.
Overall, these findings show that profitable (but morally
undesirable) information attracts attention at the expense of
less profitable (but morally desirable) information, thus shap-
ing ethical blind spots. Therefore, interventions that redirect
people’s attention back toward morally desirable information
should reduce ethical blind spots and promote honesty. This is
in line with the REVISE framework put forth by Ayal et al.
(2015). According to this model, providing subtle cues that
increase the saliency of ethical criteria can decrease dishones-
ty in tempting and ambiguous situations. To be effective, these
cues should be timely, which means that they should be pre-
sented right before people have the opportunity to cheat.
Building on this framework, we reasoned that one possible
intervention involves visual saliency: The extent to which
visual stimuli stand out from the environment, for example
because they are high in contrast or contain sharp edges (Itti,
Koch, & Niebur, 1998). Salient stimuli capture people’s atten-
tion (Yantis & Jonides, 1984), and in real-life settings tend to
be preferred over less salient stimuli (Orquin, Scholderer, &
Jeppesen, 2012).
In two experiments (one pre-registered) we asked partici-
pants to report a Target Digit (among multiple digits) that was
indicated by a Cue (Fig. 1). The cue was a fuzzy and jittery
line-segment that was slightly biased towards another digit,
which we call the Second-Cued Digit. Participants were either
paid for accurately reporting the Target Digit (Accuracy con-
dition) or were paid based on the value of the reported digit,
regardless of accuracy, such that reporting a higher digit
yielded a higher payoff (Report condition). On some trials,
the Second-Cued Digit was higher than the Target Digit.
Here, participants in the Report condition could make self-
serving (but not self-hurting) mistakes to increase their payoff.
In other words, dishonesty would manifest itself as a tendency
to report the Target Digit less often (and the Second-Cued
Digit more often) when it is lower than the Second-Cued
Digit, compared to when it is higher than the Second-Cued
Digit.
Experiment 1 tested whether, when making self-serving
mistakes, participants’ initial eye movements are directed to-
ward the tempting digit even when this is the dishonest option;
if so, this would suggest that participants’ reports are caused
by the rapid emergence of blind spots.
Experiment 2 tested whether increasing the visual saliency
of the Target Digit would reduce self-serving mistakes.
Crucially, the digit stimuli were large enough to be discrimi-
nated in peripheral vision; therefore, participants could
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directly look at the digit that attracted attention most, without
first needing to scan the display with a series of eye
movements.
Methods
General procedure and apparatus
Participants were recruited through the student subject pool of
the University of Groningen in exchange for course credit and
an amount of money based on their performance. On average,
participants earned €6 (~US$7.07). The study was approved
by the local ethics committee of the University of Groningen,
and all participants read and signed a consent form before
participation. In both experiments, participants sat approxi-
mately 60 cm away from a 21-in. screen (resolution 1,920 ×
1,080 px). Eye movements were recorded with an Eye Tribe
eye tracker (Denmark; sampling rate = 30 Hz, accuracy =
0.50°) and stimuli were presented using OpenSesame 3.1
(Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012). Following a nine-
point calibration, participants received verbal and written in-
structions. Both experiments lasted ±35 mins, after which par-
ticipants were thanked and debriefed. All data and experimen-





Sixty participants (83% female, Mage= 21.44 years) took part
in the study. Sample size was determined based on previous
work (Pittarello et al., 2015), although we used 50% more
participants to ensure a high statistical power. All participants
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Fourteen additional
participants completed the experiment but did not pass the
manipulation check at the end of the experiment. These par-
ticipants were replaced and excluded from the analysis.
Procedure
Participants saw a circular arrangement of eight randomly
presented digits (from 1 to 8), one of which (the Target
Digit) was indicated by a central jittery cue. After 2,500 ms,
a central question mark appeared, and participants indicated
the Target Digit (Fig. 1a). Participants in the Accuracy condi-
tion (N=30) earned €0.06 (~$0.07) for accurately reporting the
Target Digit, and €0 otherwise. Participants in the Report con-
dition (N=30) were paid according to the digit they reported,
with higher digits meaning higher payoffs (i.e., 1 = €0.01, 2 =
€0.02, 3 = €0.03, 4 = €0.04, 5 = €0.05, 6 = €0.06, 7 = €0.07,
Fig. 1 (a) A schematic representation of the experimental procedure for
Experiments 1 and 2. In this example, the cue points halfway between the
“2” and the “6,”which we refer to as 50% ambiguity. (b) In Experiment 2,
the visual saliency of the Target Digit was either increased or decreased
relative to that of the Second-Cued digit. In this example, the saliency of
the Target Digit (“2”) is increased relative to the saliency of the Second-
Cued Digit (“7”). The saliency map was generated with the Python
Saliency Map library (https://github.com/mayoYamasaki/saliency-map)
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and 8 = €0.08). Within blocks, we varied the ambiguity of the
cue, such that it pointed slightly (10%) or moderately (30%) in
the direction of the Second-Cued Digit, or exactly in-between
the Target Digit and the Second-Cued Digit (i.e., fully ambig-
uous; 50%). On some trials, the Second-Cued Digit was
higher (i.e., more profitable) than the Target Digit (tempting
trials), while on other trials it was lower (i.e., less profitable)
than the Target Digit (non-tempting trials).
The complete experimental design included one between-
subject factor (condition: Accuracy vs. Report) and two
within-subject factors (Cue ambiguity: low vs. medium vs.
high; and Second-Cued Digit value [temptation]: higher vs.
lower than the cued digit). Participants performed six practice
trials followed by five blocks of 24 trials and received feed-
back about their cumulative earnings after each trial. At the
end of the experiment, participants were presented with the
following manipulation check: “Please pay attention! We
want to make sure that you understood how you earned mon-
ey in this task. You received: ..”. Participants could choose one
of the following options: “More money for a correct than an
incorrect answer (regardless of whether you reported a high or
low digit)” or “More money for reporting a high than a low
digit (regardless of whether your answer was correct).” The
exact phrasing of the manipulation check was changed half-
way the experiment, when it became clear that participants
frequently failed the manipulation check because they did
not understand the question (while their responses suggested
that they had understood the task). Participants also filled out a
personality questionnaire either before or after the experiment.
These data are not reported here since they were outside the
scope of our investigation. However, including these mea-
sures did not change any of results reported below.
Results
Behavior
To test for self-serving mistakes, we conducted a general lin-
ear mixed-effects model (GLM) with proportion of target-
digit reports (binomial) as dependent variable, Condition,
Second-Cued Value, and Cue ambiguity as fixed effects. We
also added two interactions that were of clear theoretical in-
terest, because these reflect possible different patterns of be-
havior between the report and accuracy conditions: Cue am-
biguity × Condition, and Second-Cued Value × Condition.
Our models included by-participant random intercepts for all
fixed effects, but no random slopes (including random slopes
often caused failures to converge). Fixed effects were cen-
tered, such that their mean was 0, with steps of 1 between
consecutive levels. Results showed a main effect of
Condition, with participants reporting the Target Digit on
73% of the trials in the Accuracy condition versus 47% of
the trials in the Report condition, B=-1.58, SE=.27, Z=-5.87,
p <.0001. We found a main effect of Cue ambiguity, B=-.98,
SE=.07, Z=-14.13, p <.0001 showing that the Target Digit
was reported less frequently when the location of the cue
was more ambiguous. These main effects were qualified by
a significant Condition × Cue ambiguity interaction, B=.69,
SE=.14, Z=4.97, p <.0001, indicating that participants were
less sensitive to the location of the cue in the Report condition
than in the Accuracy condition, where greater ambiguity
corresponded to a higher rate of mistakes. There was a main
effect of Second-Cued Value, B=-.96, SE=.13, Z=-7.21, p
<.0001, indicating that accuracy was lower if the Second-
Cued Digit was higher than the Target Digit (53%) versus
lower than the Target Digit (67%). Importantly, there was a
Condition × Second-Cued Value interaction, B=-1.78,
SE=.27, Z=-6.61, p <.0001. Participants in the Accuracy con-
dition reported the Target Digit equally often regardless of
whether it was lower (72%) or higher (73%) than the
Second-Cued Digit. However, those in the Report condition
made self-serving mistakes: They reported the Target Digit
less often when it was lower (34%) versus higher (60%) than
the Second-Cued Digit, conceptually replicating prior work
by Pittarello et al. (2015).
The distribution of mean reported digits for individual par-
ticipants in the Report condition is mostly continuous, even
though we observed a cluster of participants who consistently
reported “8” (Fig. 2b). We label the latter group as “brazen
liars” (see Weisel & Shalvi, 2015) who seemed not to be
affected by our manipulations. For robustness purposes, we
conducted the same analyses after removing participants
whose average reports were 7.5 or higher. Doing so did not
meaningfully change the results reported here (see
Supplementary Material, Fig. 1S).
Overall, the behavior showed that if participants were paid
based on the digit that they reported, (a) they were less sensi-
tive to the cue, (b) they frequently misreported the Second-
Cued Digit when it was more valuable than the target (self-
serving mistakes), (c) they frequently misreported the highest
digit, and (d) the tendency to cheat was distributed more or
less continuously in the participant sample, meaning that
cheaters exist in all sizes: some cheat very little, some a bit
more, and others consistently reported “8.”
Eye movements
We first created seven temporal bins of equal duration. Next,
for each bin separately, and for each condition (Accuracy vs.
Report) we conducted two separate GLMs: The first included
the proportion of fixations on the Target Digit (binomial) as
the dependent variable, the main effects of Target Reported
(whether or not the target was reported on a given trial) and
Second-Cued Value, and their interaction as fixed effects. The
second was identical but included the proportion of fixations
on the Second-Cued Digit as the dependent variable. As for
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the behavioral analysis, models included by-participant ran-
dom intercepts for all fixed effects, but no random slopes.
Fixed effects were centered, such that their mean was 0, with
steps of 1 between consecutive levels.
Figure 3 shows the proportion of the eye fixations on the
Target Digit (teal line) and Second-Cued Digit (orange line)
for the Accuracy and Report condition over time, where time
was divided into seven bins. In the Report condition, there was
a main effect of Target Reported for bin 2, B=1.26, SE=.28,
Z=4.36, p <.0001, bin 3, B=1.35, SE=.17, Z=7.78, p <.0001,
bin 4, B=1.40, SE=.21, Z=6.60, p <.0001, bin 5, B=.82,
SE=.23, Z=3.52, p <.001, bin 6, B=1.37, SE=.38, Z=3.63, p
<.001, and marginally for bin 7, B=.92, SE=.49, Z=1.88, p
=.06 on the proportion of fixations on the Target Digit.
Similarly, there was a main effect of Second-Cued Reported
for bin 2, B=1.22, SE=.41, Z=2.99, p <.0001, bin 3, B=2.03,
SE=.20, Z=9.97, p <.0001, bin 4, B=2.28, SE=.25, Z=9.21, p
<.0001, bin 5, B=1.78, SE=.32, Z=5.55, p <.0001, and bin 6,
Fig. 2 Behavioral results for Experiment 1. On the Y-axis we report the total number of trials (for panel a and c) on which participants reported their
choice. Overall, there were 7,200 trials in Experiment 1 (3,600 trials per condition). Error bars represent standard errors
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B=2.05, SE=.39, Z=5.24, p <.0001 on the proportion of fixa-
tions on the Second-Cued Digit. There was no main effect of
temptation above and beyond the effect of the reported digit
(no p < .05).
The same analyses in the Accuracy condition showed that
there was a main effect of the Target Reported for bin 3,
B=1.94, SE=.42, Z=4.67, p <.0001, bin 4, B=.63, SE=.01,
Z=377.98, p <.0001, and bin 5, B=.91, SE=.38, Z=2.41, p
=.015. There was an effect of Second-Cued Digit Reported
for bin 3, B=2.49, SE=.44, Z=5.60, p <.0001, bin 4 B=2.23,
SE=.37, Z=5.93, p <.0001, bin 5 B=1.93, SE=.40, Z=4.86, p
<.0001, bin 6 B=1.72, SE=.49, Z=3.54, p <.001, and bin 7
B=2.47, SE=.86, Z=2.87, p <.01. Additionally, we found an
interaction between Second-Cued Digit Reported and
Second-Cued Value for bin 3, B=2.03, SE=.83, Z=2.45, p
=.01, and for bin 5, B=1.77, SE=.79, Z=2.24, p =.03, indicat-
ing that the effect of Second-Cued Digit reported was stronger
when the Second-Cued Digit was higher than the Target Digit
(see Fig. 2S in the Supplementary Material for the pattern
without “brazen liars”).
In the report condition, where cheating was possible, the
finding that participants quickly look at higher digits – even
when, in the report condition, these digits were the dishonest
options – suggests that ethical blind spots (and subsequent
self-serving mistakes) arise quickly as soon the digits appear.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 tested whether it is possible to limit ethical blind
spots and reduce self-serving mistakes through a
counteracting bias that guides participants away from the
Second-Cued Digit. To accomplish this, we made the
Second-Cued Digit either less salient than the Target Digit,
Fig. 3 Eye-movement results for Experiment 1 split by condition (a, b:
Accuracy; c, d: Report) and the digit that was reported by the participant
(a, c: Target; b, d: Second-Cued Digit). In all cases, participants look
mostly at the digit that they will report later. The data shown in (b) are
somewhat noisy, because there were relatively few trials in the Accuracy
condition on which participants reported the Second-Cued Digit. Error
bars represent standard errors
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with the aim to reduce cheating, or more salient, with the aim
to increase cheating. Experiment 2 included only the Report
condition and was preregistered as https://osf.io/n7xu6/.
Methods
Participants
Thirty participants (72.7% female, Mage= 24.18 years) took
part in the study (i.e., the same sample size as in each
condition of Experiment 1). All participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision. Four additional participants com-
pleted the experiment but did not pass the manipulation check
at the end of the experiment (see Procedure of Experiment 1).
These participants were replaced and excluded from the
analysis.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to the Report condition of
Experiment 1 with the following exceptions. First, the ambi-
guity of the cue was fixed at an intermediate level (30%).
Second, the Second-Cued Digit was either more or less salient
than the Target Digit. The saliency of all other digits was
intermediate. We manipulated the saliency of the stimuli by
reducing their contrast with the background, such that high
saliency corresponded to a contrast of 100% (as in
Experiment 1), intermediate saliency to a contrast of 50%,
and low saliency to a contrast of 25%. The complete experi-
mental design included two within-subject factors (value of
the Second-Cued Digit: higher [tempting] vs. lower [non-
tempting] than the Target Digit; and saliency of the Second-
Cued Digit: more vs. less salient than the Target Digit).
Participants performed eight practice trials, followed by eight
blocks of 28 trials.
Behavior
Similar to Experiment 1, we conducted a GLM with propor-
tion of target-digit reports as dependent variable, and
Temptation, Saliency, and the Temptation × Saliency interac-
tion as fixed effects. The pattern of self-serving mistakes rep-
licates that observed in Experiment 1. We found a main effect
of Temptation, B=-4.12, SE=.64, Z=-6.37, p <.0001, showing
that participants reported the Target Digit on 14% of the trials
when the Second-Cued Digit was higher than the Target Digit
versus 38% of the trials when the Second-Cued Digit was
lower than the Target Digit. Crucially, there was also a main
effect of Saliency, B=1.17, SE=.33, Z=3.56, p <.001, indicat-
ing that participants tended to report the Target Digit if it was
more salient than the Second-Cued Digit. Finally, there was
Temptation × Saliency interaction, B=.82, SE=.28, Z=2.96, p
<.01, reflecting that the effect of Saliency was reduced when
the Second-Cued Digit was higher than the Target Digit, pos-
sibly due to a floor effect (i.e., in that case the number of target
reports was low, reducing the effect of Saliency). As in
Experiment 1, we found a cluster of “brazen liars”who report-
ed the highest digit, and thus were not sensitive to our manip-
ulations. Removing these participants did not change the re-
sults (see Supplementary Material, Fig. 3S) (Fig. 4).
Eye movements
Similar to Experiment 1, for seven temporal bins separately,
we conducted a GLM with proportion of fixations on the
Target Digit as dependent variable, and Temptation,
Saliency, and the Temptation × Saliency interaction as fixed
effects. We conducted an analogous-but-separate GLM with
proportion of fixations on the Second-Cued Digit as depen-
dent variable.
Figure 5 shows that eye movements were driven by the
saliency and, although to a lesser extent, the value of the
digits. There were main effects of Target Saliency for bin 3,
B=.99, SE=.12, Z=8.31, p <.0001, and bin 4, B=.37, SE=.14,
Z=2.72, p <.01, and Temptation for bin 1, B=-.38, SE=.18,
Z=-2.10, p =.03, and bin 5, B=-.41, SE=.14, Z=-2.86, p =.004
on the proportion of fixations on the Target Digit.
Similarly, there were main effects of Target Saliency for bin
3, B=-.83, SE=.12, Z=-6.99, p <.0001, bin 4 B=-.49, SE=.14,
Z=-3.52, p <.001, and bin 5 B=-.48, SE=.14, Z=-3.33, p
<.001, and Temptation for bin 3, B=.25, SE=.12, Z=2.09, p
=.04, and bin 4, B=.30, SE=.14, Z=2.14, p =.04 on the pro-
portion of fixations on the Second-Cued Digit (see Fig. 5S in
the Supplementary Material for the pattern without “brazen
liars”).
Thus, by increasing the visual saliency of a stimulus, we
were able to guide participants’ gaze and attention toward it,
which subsequently increased the probability of participants
reporting this digit. The effect of visual saliency on eye move-
ments was especially pronounced around 500–1,000 ms (bin
3) after the onset of the stimulus display. This is relatively
slow for an effect that is, by definition, driven by bottom-up
stimulus features (e.g., Theeuwes et al., 1998). Presumably,
eye movements were slightly delayed in our paradigm be-
cause the jittery cue was itself a salient visual event that briefly
kept gaze locked to the display center. However, even though
with a slight delay, our visual-saliency manipulation had the
typical effect of attracting gaze especially strongly early in
time, and less so later in time (cf. Donk & Van Zoest, 2008).
Discussion
When honesty and profit conflict, people often show ethical
blind spots; that is, they pay more attention to self-serving (yet
immoral) information at the expense of less profitable (yet
moral) information (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011;
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Pittarello et al., 2015). But when do ethical blind spots arise?
And can they be reduced?
In two experiments using eye tracking, we found that –
overall – people tend to look quickly at the option that they
would later report, even when this option is dishonest (but
more profitable). In our paradigm, the first eye movements
were made fairly slowly, presumably because attention was
first pulled toward the central cue, and it took some time for
participants to disengage from this and initiate an eye move-
ment. Therefore, the first eye movements are not reflexive in
the same way that, for example, very rapid eye movements
toward sudden onsets are reflexive (e.g., Theeuwes et al.,
1998). However, the first eye movements likely nevertheless
reflect the first step in the attentional selection of the stimuli,
and – crucially – this first attentional selection is already bi-
ased toward the profitable option. The fact that blind spots
arise relatively early in a complex task like ours indicates that
our findings would be stronger using simpler cheating tasks
where, for instance, participants have to choose between two
colors or shapes to determine their pay, or where less attention
is allocated to a fixation point preceding choices.
Importantly, we show that it is possible to reduce ethical
blind spots by increasing the visual saliency of honest options,
thus guiding attention toward them in a bottom-up way
(Theeuwes et al., 1998), suggesting that a simple and non-
invasive visual intervention can redirect people’s attention
and gaze toward morally desirable information.
We contribute to the literature on behavioral ethics in two
important ways. First, our study is the first to directly show that
people’s attention is quickly biased toward profitable choice
options, even if these correspond to dishonest behaviors (see
Hochman et al., 2016; Pittarello et al., 2015; converging on the
same point). Thus, we extend current work on the attentional
processing underlying morality (Fiedler & Glöckner, 2015).
Fig. 4 Behavioral results for Experiment 2. On the Y-axis we report the total number of trials on which participants reported their choice. Overall, there
were 6,720 trials in Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard errors
Fig. 5 Eye-movement results for Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard errors.
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Second, we demonstrate a cost-effective intervention to reduce
self-serving mistakes. Specifically, we suggest that subtly in-
creasing the saliency of morally preferable options can make
people focus more on such information, in turn reducing the
tendency to make morally questionable choices.
Some limitations are worth discussing. First, the presence
of “brazen liars” (participants who always selected the most
profitable option, thus disregarding the task instruction alto-
gether) seems to indicate that some people are not sensitive to
either temptation or saliency. While our main findings were
not affected by “brazen liars,” their existence may limit the
generalizability of our results. Second, it is unclear whether
participants noted the saliency manipulation in Experiment 2,
and if so, how they reacted to it. Exploring for whom saliency
hampers or increases dishonesty would allow for more fine-
grained future interventions.
Accordingly, it would be interesting to test different ways
to manipulate saliency, and to identify under which circum-
stances they are more (or less) effective in shaping ethical
choices, and whether they could be used to increase accuracy
when no incentives to cheat are provided. Finally, a promising
avenue would be to test whether psychological traits such as a
feeling of entitlement –which recent research found to predict
dishonesty (Schurr and Ritov, 2016) – predict the extent to
which participants are susceptible to the effect of saliency.
Another interesting possibility would be to make externalities
(the cost of lying) more salient. It can be argued that partici-
pants did not really feel that they were stealing, and thus did
not feel guilty for their behavior. One way to address this
question would be stressing the fact that rewards would be
taken from the experimenters’, or another student’s budget.
In summary, everyday life provides plenty of opportunities
for cheating. In such settings, people tend to immediately fo-
cus on profitable (yet dishonest) information, showing ethical
blind spots.We suggest a potential remedy to such blind spots:
Makingmoral informationmore salient can reduce convenient
“oversights” and foster ethicality.
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